We have seen the images so many times, they are seared on our souls. And remembering the horror, reliving the anguish, re-imagining the terror is hard and painful. For all Americans it has been a year of adjustment, of coming to terms with the difficult knowledge that our nation has determined enemies, and that we are not invulnerable to their attacks. . . . We resolved a year ago to honor every last person lost. We owe them remembrance, and we owe them more. We owe them and their children and our own the most enduring monument we can build: a world of liberty and security, made possible by the way America leads and by the way Americans lead our lives.
-President George Bush at Ellis Island September 11, 2002 1 What is striking about these two passages from otherwise generic speeches is the movement in them from emotional identification to collective action, from memory of tragedy to national mobilization for war. Horror, anguish, and the struggle to measure a "loss that cannot be weighed" are invoked as the coalescence of a unified national will to vengeance. The transition happens so quickly that dissenters from the buildup to war easily become confused with people who have no sympathy for the grief of those who lost loved ones in the terrorist attacks. There is no separation between grief and policy, emotion and reason here. The only way to adjust appropriately to the shock of U.S. vulnerability is to resolve to act against those that targeted us for terror. Any other adjustmentfor example, the desire to study the history of U. S. foreign policy to discover what abuses have generated the terrorists' desperation -is suspect.
2 As social philosopher Dominick LaCapra has noted, "When absence is converted into loss, one increases the likelihood of misplaced nostalgia or utopian politics in quest of a new totality or fully unified community" (1999, p. 698) . In this sense, the politics of war offered by President Bush on the anniversary of the September 11, 2002 attacks hastily convert absence into loss in order to construct a fully unified national community. LaCapra adds, "This conflation tends to take place so rapidly that it escapes notice and seems natural or necessary. Yet, among other questionable consequences, it threatens to convert subsequent accounts into displacements of the story of original sin wherein a prelapsarian state of unity or identity -whether real or fictive -is understood as giving way through a fall to difference and conflict. It also typically involves the tendency to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms" (p. 700).
3 As I argued in my book Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics (1998) , there are important imbrications of the therapeutic, nationalism, and affect in U. S. public culture. In a chapter on the war of emotions during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, I wrote, "During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. television news played a key role in domesticating dissent by rearticulating political outrage as personal anxiety and reconfiguring the will to resist as the need to support our troops. The mobilization of the themes and language of psychological crisis and emotional support domesticated the home front because images of families quietly coping with the treat of war served as the key icon for the manufacturers of appropriate public response. . . . During the war, the American nation was itself figured as a unitary body -the body anti-politic -in need of comfort and reassurance" (pp. 85-86).
Since September 11, 2001 , this rhetoric of national therapy has reemerged with a vengeance, defining an American public in terms of emotional support and consolation rather than political deliberation, debate, or weighing of alternatives to war based on in-depth knowledge and critical thinking.
Muffling Academic Speech in Emotion
4 At the University of Texas, where I teach, the voices of progressive faculty were smothered in the thick consolatory space of mourning that followed September's terrorist attacks. Several days after the attacks, journalism professor Bob Jensen published an op-ed in the Houston Chronicle (2001). Jensen argued that if we found the indiscriminate targeting of civilians to be beyond justification on U.S. soil, we should also find it to be so in Afghanistan, where U.S. bombs killed more tan 3000 civilians, according to some estimates (Milne 2001 9 Many of these responses appeared in the newspaper. In addition, vilification of me preoccupied the conservative web sites frontpagemag.com and freerepublic.com. A local student conservative group's discussion board was full of calls for my head and my job. I was invited to do interviews on right-wing radio, and I did speak there. I heard through the grapevine that I won over a listener to the Michael Medved show. I also responded on the web sites, much to the surprise of the freepers (members of the Free Republic internet community) and other conservatives, who apparently didn't know they let people like me on those web sites.
In a published op-ed, I replied to my detractors:
10 Ben Franklin wrote that when a nation prioritizes security over liberty, the consequences could be dire for democracy. Contrary to my correspondents, I do not believe that order is the ground from which all liberty springs. History teaches quite another lesson -it took a civil war, for example, to end slavery. And "order" is a god term not of democratic societies but of fascism. Unfortunately, I believe that in this extremely sensitive time people are all too willing to embrace a notion of security -not only against terrorists but also against critical ideas and thoughtful dialogue -over liberty. I hope that this set of expanded arguments makes for more thinking and fewer personal attacks. Of course, I hoped to provoke a response and I welcome debate and dialogue. I do not feel like a victim and I am not complaining about being criticized. However, I hoped to get a real response, not just hate and intimidation in the name of freedom. I encourage activists with views similar to mine to come out into the light of day. The urgency of speaking now far outweighs the flak we will get for standing up (2002b).
11 This controversy points up the ways in which security and affect are discursively aligned. The will to order often arises from an emotional state; when one feels that one's basic security is threatened, one is likely to respond out of fear and hatred. These emotions are not the proper basis on which to found a discussion of U. S. foreign policy in a democratic society. Yet these emotions have been the mainstay of both popular and political discourses since September 11, 2001.
The Affected Public
12 To describe the work of these discourses, I have coined the term "affected public." In using the word "affected," I mean to invoke several layers of meaning. "Affected" can mean addled, as in affected or touched in the head. "Affected" also can mean constructed, put on, or artificial, as in an affected accent. Finally "affected" can be used to refer to the influence of emotion or affect on a situation. (Koziak, 2000, p. 82) . But who is to say whose anger is just and whose is not? Given the inevitability of human emotion in all political affairs, this judgment can only come from conscious alignment with particular groups and their interests. The questions at hand, then, are: in whose interests are the emotional appeals dominant today in U.S. public life; and, to what ends are they put? Today the forces of social stability have far greater access to and control over the content of commercial mass media, where appeals to fear and national belonging subvert critical thinking about war and democracy.
14 Left activists and scholars charge conservatives with mobilizing unreason in the service of oppression, exploitation, and unjust war. Against an unthinking nationalism, leftist writers offer evidence of contradiction between claim and reality: There are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; the United States built up the dictator Charles Taylor in Nigeria, just as it did Saddam Hussein in Iraq; the Taliban were once U.S. allies. To me, this strategy of exposing contradiction and offering counter-evidence seems to be more than pitting one emotional appeal against another. Some attachments are held in the face of contrary evidence simply out of unreasoning blindness. This warrants an appeal to reason as a democratizing impulse. Appeals to fear enforce order with profoundly undemocratic consequences. It is not simply a matter of greater effectiveness by the right wing at this historical moment in mobilizing emotion in the public sphere.
15 Both left and right should adhere to a simple ethical standard in using emotional appeals. Emotional exhortations should be connected to reasoned cases for action or identification; and these should presented in forums that enable dialogue, challenge, and deliberation over alternatives. But in the affected public, there is little deliberative space; and exhortations to war substitute emotion for the reasoned case, rather than enabling the conjoint workings of reason and emotion. In the affected public, appeals to emotion render debate and deliberation unthinkable, as illustrated by my experience recounted above. Emotion is a weapon against dissent and grants credence to lies. As I suggest below, the left must use the resources of demystification -which means countering emotion with reason -in the process of building a counter-hegemonic movement. Emotion is not irrelevant to that project, but neither can it be central if one is to win people to a movement for cause rather than faith.
16 Robert Hariman and John Lucaites have argued that the "modern civic order is based on muted affect -that is, on the containment of emotionality, and especially negative emotions, to private life and its institutions of family, church, clinic, and television" (2001, p. 6). They suggest that dissent is discredited in the media by associating it with emotional display, whereas politics proper is conducted under the standards of reason and decorum. While it is true that the ideal of bourgeois civic life as constituted in modern times rests upon a Cartesian separation of reason and emotion or desire (and attendant suspicion of emotion and desire as motivators in the public realm), I must disagree with Hariman and Lucaites' claim that the civic order is, in reality, characterized by muted affect. First, it is impossible to separate television from political life and the public sphere in the world today. When television evokes and deploys emotional response, it often does so in politicized contexts and in a medium that links audience members together in shared meaning and experience.
17 More important, however, is my observation that contemporary public life, especially as it is constructed around national identity and war, is heavily imbued with legitimated emotion. The lines between public and private here are blurred. Emotion is encouraged and expected in public after experiences of collective trauma. In these instances, absence of emotion is what is rendered suspect, not its presence. The figure of woman is no longer simply a private-sphere icon. On the home front, women become vessels of collectivity, of shared caring put into the service of national political goals. Hariman and Lucaites argue that relegating emotion to the private sphere, and thereby discrediting "cries of protest" "can have anti-democratic consequences" (p. 17). I believe this insight is accurate. Yet I also think that infusing political life with emotional imperatives that silence the voice of reason also carries profound anti-democratic potentiality.
18 As Hariman and Lucaites note, emotion is a set of intersubjectivenot psychological or interior -phenomena. Thus emotions are cocreated in communication, and we can examine how emotions are deployed rhetorically to create identification in various social spaces. Emotional expression is treated differentially in public life depending on whose expression it is and to what ends its display is put. We should take note of whose emotions are allowed to appear without stigma in public and under what circumstances. Nationalism may be a special case in which strong emotion -even negative emotion such as anger, grief, and hatred -appear most legitimately in political contexts.
Epideictic as the Form of the Affected Public
19 The affected public is a national sphere that relies on the epideictic -discourse of praise and blame, belonging and exclusion, ceremony and remembrance. Rhetoricians have long been aware of the power of epideictic discourse, the rhetoric of consolation, identification, and social unity around shared values, to bring a divided public together. Recently Gerard Hauser (1999) has explored the didactic function of epideictic in laying the ground for political action. Hauser argues against critical scholars who bemoan the inherently conservative tendencies in ceremonial discourse. Instead he notes the democratic potential of epideictic. Discourses of praise and blame can instruct publics in moral rectitude and establish common ground for action, and sometimes epideictic can be a vehicle for controversy and insight. (Cohn 2002, pp. 19-20) .
24 Thus the American culture of consolation that gives language to the affected public -antagonistic to controversy, history, and evidence-based reasoning -is cultivated even more strongly during wartime. I do not mean to blame ordinary people themselves, whose grief, shock, and horror on and since September 11 are understandable. Of course, some consolation is appropriate under such circumstances. The cultivation in politics, the news media, and popular culture of an addiction to epideictic is another matter. Identification feels good. It is like a drug. 
Antidotes to the Affected Public

S. motives and goals in this war?
There is some evidence that the United States had been pressuring the Taliban in Afghanistan long before September 11 to cooperate with plans for a new oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea through the country. The world, its people, and its resources are fair game for trans-national corporations. But these corporations still have national home bases to which their profits inexorably flow. When a nation-state's economic or geopolitical interests are threatened by an upstart dictator, competing nation states and their interests, movements for social justice, or political and economic instability, military intervention often results. War is the face of globalization that reveals it to be little different than the imperialisms of any other capitalist period. But as during the Persian Gulf War, the public is not encouraged to think beyond the stated motives of vengeance and elimination of terrorism.
26 Second, what are the actual and likely consequences for ordinary people of this war? It is not likely that the war on terrorism will end terrorism. More likely, it will exacerbate the anger and despair of Arabs and others in countries affected by the austerity required of ordinary people by globalizers, the rain of bombs, the cruelty of sanctions, and the support of the U.S. in the Middle East for what should be named for what it is: colonialism and apartheid. In the process of achieving its economic and geopolitical aims, the United States has already caused the deaths of thousands of innocents, including as many as 3,800 people in Afghanistan, according to University of New Hampshire economics professor Marc Herold. As the London Guardian reported, "Based on corroborated reports from aid agencies, the UN, eyewitnesses, TV stations, newspapers and news agencies around the world, Herold estimates that at least 3,767 civilians were killed by U.S. bombs between October 7 and December 10.
That is an average of 62 innocent deaths a day -and an even higher figure than the 3,234 now thought to have been killed in New York and Washington on September 11" (Milne 2001, p. 16 ).
27 In a widely-discussed article, conservative Sebastian Mallaby (2002) suggests that the U.S. need for a stable international scene and the failure of aid and development programs such as those overseen by the IMF and World Bank warrant a new imperialism in which the U.S. should impose its aims by force in every troubled nation. Mallaby argues that the U.S. might benefit by engaging in neo-colonial nation building. The discourse of foreign policy makers is clear in its statement of motive, clear in identifying the United States as an imperialist power at the center of geopolitics today, and clear in defending the right of U.S. to maintain its position by force.
28 Meanwhile poststructuralist theorists deny the significance of United States imperialism altogether. Hardt and Negri argue in their popular book Empire (2000) that economic globalization has brought with it a new form of sovereignty. In the postmodern global economy, the important phenomena for scholarly examination are not political and economic in nature. Rather the production of social life in culture takes center stage. Even as the U.S. readies its forces in the Middle East without endorsement from the United Nations, Hardt and Negri claim, the sovereignty of nation-states has declined. Rather than posit a critical rational sphere, such as the one that can and does develop in oppositional social movements, they argue that we ought to celebrate the resistance that is already everywhere in the expression of marginal subjectivities organized around multitudinous shared identifications on the plane of immanence. Late capitalism is "beyond refusal," they write (p. 204). It is beyond rational intervention.
29 The spectacle of fear that holds together the postmodern, hybrid constitution and the media manipulation of the public and politics certainly takes the ground away from a struggle over the imperial constitution. It seems as if there is no place left to stand, no weight to any possible resistance, but only an implacable machine of power. It is important to recognize the power of the spectacle and the impossibility of traditional forms of struggle, but this is not the end of the story. As the old sites and forms of struggle decline, new and more powerful ones arise (p. 324).
30 But they do not say where, when, or how these new struggles will take shape. They do not say how any can raise voices and fists against the falling bombs if they cannot name the United States as the center of modern empire any longer. It is not clear how nomadism and miscegenation will disarm the war machine.
31 Like wartime propagandists in a therapeutic culture, poststructuralist theory too often substitutes identification for reasoning, image events for dialogue, and dissemination for deliberation as the key terms to describe how persuasion happens in late capitalism, replicating the dominance of epideictic over deliberation in American public life (DeLuca 1999; Greene 1999) . These theorists suggest that we resign ourselves to charting a hyper-mediated and irrational reality that is not, in any deep sense of the word, democratic. This work may accurately describe existing communicative practices in late capitalism. Yet according to such scholarship, the best we can do is to describe the strategies at work in public discourse. Appeals to standards for criticalrational deliberation are only so much pie-in-the-sky.
32 Yet there can and must be other, different, practices. University of Texas professor Jim Fishkin (1991) found in a widely-publicized experiment in deliberative polling that, when ordinary people are provided with enough information to deliberate and form well-reasoned opinions, they do so (Wolf 1996) . As I write in the spring of 2003, the anti-war movement is galvanizing the public: Millions of U. S. citizens, and 2 billion people around the world have demonstrated against the coming war on Iraq. These events are the product of, and offer openings to, critical interventions into public discourse by activists and scholars. Rhetoricians have the resources to foster the dissemination of information from multiple points of view in public. In addition, we have the skills of criticism to expose propaganda and consolation as inadequate forms of discourse in a democracy. I believe, however, that we cannot limit our work to descriptive analysis as our leaders and entertainers substitute identification for reasoning. (Thompson 1990, p. 281) . Given that we cannot know those hidden realities without understanding them in systems of signification, depth hermeneutics can expose and analyze contradictions in the answers we find for important questions. Especially during a war, hegemonic rhetorics exhibit the characteristics of propaganda, an old-fashioned but useful word for opposition-silencing, agendaobscuring texts.
34 As noted above, Koziak (2000) suggests an additional corrective: the recovery of political emotion. Instead of bifurcating reason and emotion, she argues, we might do as Aristotle did and see utility in the reasonable political uses and expressions of emotion. She notes that even for Marx, who privileged rational action based on shared interests over irrational national identification, alienation is the emotion that "makes plain the inhumanity of factory labor" (p. 11). Some emotional repertoires are better than others, according to Koziak, and 38 Beyond that task, we have to find venues and media to encourage critical thinking among publics at large. We must also take up and re-circulate the counter-hegemonic voices that can and do find spaces for dissent in an affected culture. Any cursory review of modern history would show clearly that nationalism does not always trump reason and dissent in the United States or around the world. The very large movement against this recent round of wars peaked on February 15, 2002 in world-wide demonstrations against war in Iraq. The movement did not stop the war or the occupation, yet it built publics within which counter-discourses continue to circulate. In LaCapra's (1998) terms, this movement inside and outside the academy has the capacity to foster ethical remembrance, a kind of working-through-trauma that does not reify its terms. We must disrupt the equations of grief with vengeance, war with justice, and dissent with terror. In a society of therapeutic rhetorics, we must take on the counter-hegemonic task of rebuilding political publics as the nation goes, once again, to war.
